The city argues that the directive does not expressly oblige tenants to pay the debts of their predecessors, but imposes this obligation on landlords, is in accordance with the Constitution. Whether the city`s objective is for it to be repaid by the person liable for the debt or by the tenant directly concerned by its collection system is irrelevant for constitutional purposes. Neither of the two objectives “gives the city the license to continue the payment by denying the water supply to an independent and uncom engaged third party, whether that third party is the new tenant or another foreigner of the previous service contract.” O`Neal, 66 F.3d to 1068. We come to the conclusion, as did the ninth circle in O`Neal, that “the payment of the previous tenant and the landlord would be rationally linked to the purpose of the city; It is not the refusal of a new tenant who is not obliged. Id. True, the city has different ways to recover from the previous owner or tenant without compromising the new tenant`s water supply. In fact, after the events that prompted Golden to file this lawsuit, the City put in place an obvious approach. Under a rule passed by the Director of Public Services, tenants who are about to shut down the water supply – or, as we can assume, attempt to restore the already terminated service – can deposit their rent into a Franklin County Municipal Court trust account. We do not say whether the details of this new Rule 9 are in accordance with the Constitution; 10 We refer only to this to show that cities in this cycle are not without resources to collect water supply debts simply because the equality clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution prevents them from terminating the water supply of a tenant whose owner owes water bills. If you rent a property, the city has made things easier for you. Water and wastewater are treated directly through a tenant settlement contract. This means you don`t have to deal directly with the water bill and instead have to make a monthly agreement with your landlord. With respect to the second possible basis of a property interest identified by the FourthMententh Amendment State Statutory or Common Law, Golden does not cite any Ohio statutes or case law to support its argument that it has a legitimate right to water supply. We note among ourselves that other circles have considered that certain provisions common to the owner-tenant statutes are sufficient for this purpose.
This circuit has not yet taken such an argument into account. We used Craft in one case where these are the claims of property owners who were water customers. See Mansfield, 988 F.2d at 1473-74 (the expectation of customers to continue to provide services constituted a protected property interest). And in an unprecedented statement a year before Mansfield, we were equally loyal to Craft, rejecting an owner`s claim that Ohio`s law was water-repellent to its residents. Cadle v. City of Newton Falls, No. 91-3717, 1992 WL 88904, *4-5 (6th Cir.1992) (unpublished notice). But neither Mansfield nor Cadle indicate whether a tenant who, due to non-payment by the previous tenant and the landlord, is prevented from directly entering into a water supply contract and not benefiting from water supply at all, can claim the withdrawal of a property interest without trial.
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